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THE REGULATION OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND THE
PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT
L. Glenn PERRY *
Glenn Perry focuses on regulation of auditors. He first describes tie forms of accounting regulation,
including self-regulation, peer regulation, state licensing authorities, and private litigation. Perry then
discusses the SEC's oversight of independent auditors and its remedies for misconduct. He describes the
conflict that exists between punitive regulations and preventive- corrective regulations, and asserts that
the latter is generally more beneficiaL Perry concludes that the accounting profession has made
substantial improvements but more are necessary, including higher educational and licensing standards
for certified pubhc accountants to ensure that they have adequate audit experience.
1. Introduction
Financial statements and disclosures that fairly present the financial condi-
tion and results of operations of companies are essential in making financial
decisions. The role of independent auditors who audit and express their
opinions on financial statements is a critical ingredient in this process.
Congress decided in 1933 to rely on independent auditors rather than
government auditors, to provide these essential financial opinions [1]. During a
congressional hearing that led to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933
[2], the following dialogue between Senator Robert Reynolds of North Carolina
and Colonel Arthur H. Carter, President of the New York State Society of
Certified Accountants, occurred:
Senator Reynolds: Suppose that we decide in 'the final passage of this bill here
to employ five or six hundred auditors from your organization, that would
be all right, then, would it not?
Mr. Carter: I do not think the Government could employ five or six hundred
independent accountants.
Senator Reynolds: Why could they not?
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Mr. Carter: I do not think the type of men that are in the public practice of
accountancy would leave their present practice to go into government
employ.
Senator Reynolds: Well, if it were sufficiently remunerative they would?
Mr Carter: Yes; if the Government made their time worthwhile.
Senator Reynolds: The bill here provides for taking care of the expenses
incident thereto by way of registration.
Mr. Carter: Well, you will have to build some more buildings in Washington to
house them if you are going to do that.
Senator Reynolds: Then we had better not pass this bill at all [3].
Since that time, the accounting profession has grown, both in terms of its
size and its critical role in the financial reporting and disclosure process. This
critical role is clearly demonstrated by the regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) which expressly provide that financial statements
filed with it be audited by independent auditors in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards [4].
The code of professional ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) [5] states:
The reliance of the public, the government and the business community on sound
financial reporting ... and the importance of these matters to the economic and social
aspects of life impose particular obligations on certified public accountants [6].
Moreover, in a recent decision the Supreme Court of the United States [7]
stated:
An independent certified public accountant performs a different role from an attorney
whose duty, as his client's confidential adviser and advocate, is to present the client's
case in the most favorable possible light. By certifying the public reports that collec-
tively depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The indepen-
dent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust [8].
It is well recognized that the role of independent auditors is both critical to
the financial reporting and disclosure process and that auditors have responsi-
bilities to the general public in addition to their clients. Accordingly, while the
accounting profession is a private profession with private rights, it also has
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certain public responsibilities. For this reason, the accounting profession in the
United States has historically been subjected to substantial regulation [9].
It would require a large book to describe the history of the accounting
profession and the evolution of its regulation even though it is a relatively
young profession and the regulations that govern it still younger. Prior to the
1880s, there was no accounting profession in the United States. In 1887, the
American Association of Public Accountants, the first national professional
accounting organization, was formed with thirty-one members. New York, in
1896, became the first state to license certified public accountants. In 1903, the
first audited financial statements were published by the United States Steel
Corporation. Prior to the stock market crash of 1929, there was little regulation
of the accounting profession. As a result of the crash and pressure from both
the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC, the profession began to establish
standards, or regulations.
Regulation serves two functions. The first function is to establish standards
for the accounting profession. These include, for example, generally accepted
accounting principles, generally accepted auditing standards, and ethical
standards. Second, regulations function to ensure that the accounting profes-
sion complies with these standards. There are both direct and indirect regu-
lations, and they take many forms. The major forms of regulation are self-regu-
lation, peer-regulation, state licensing authorities, private litigation, federal
government oversight, and federal government enforcement. These forms of
regulation work collectively to protect the public from unprofessional and
illegal conduct by independent auditors. Indeed, when compared to other
professions, the accounting profession is subjected to much greater regulation
[101.
2. Forms of accounting regulation
2.1. Self-regulation
Self-regulation has historically been and continues to be the most important
and effective form of regulation. Self-regulation takes two forms: individual
regulation and firm regulation.
Individual regulation is a state of mind. Absent a commitment by individual
independent auditors to professionalism and excellence, the other forms of
regulation would surely be ineffective, both individually and collectively. State
of mind cannot be directly regulated, although various forms of regulation
tend to influence state of mind. For example, peer pressures and the fear of
private litigation and SEC enforcement actions all influence state of mind. In
the final analysis, however, it is only the individual who can commit to and act
with professionalism and excellence.
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Accounting firms, including individual practitioners, operate in a highly
competitive environment where performance and professional reputation are
crucial factors in retaining existing clients and obtaining new clients. More-
over, the monetary costs associated with litigation are a real and ever present
fear for accounting firms. Therefore, most accounting firms have established
elaborate quality control systems, including systems to monitor and ensure
compliance. These generally fall into three categories.
The first is policies and procedures which concern hiring, continuing
professional education, supervision, performance appraisal, acceptance of new
clients, independence, accounting, and auditing. Second, there are monitoring
procedures which are designed to ensure that the policies and procedures
established by the firm are followed. They include review and approval of
workpapers, independent review of financial statements and accountants'
reports by qualified personnel not otherwise involved with the client, and
various forms of internal peer review. A final category consists of disciplinary
procedures which are used to discipline those who do not comply with the
firm's policies and procedures. They include salary adjustments, promotional
considerations, and, when appropriate, terminations. Firm regulation is always
present as individual independent auditors perform their professional responsi-
bilities.
Because accounting firms in the United States are in the business of
performing professional services to make a profit, they must maintain a proper
balance between business and professional considerations. Professional consid-
erations must always take precedence over business considerations. Thus,
accounting firms must constantly demonstrate their commitment to profes-
sionalism and excellence to their personnel. This is accomplished in two ways,
first, by establishing and communicating policies and procedures, by monitor-
ing procedures, and by taking disciplinary actions, and second, and more
important, by senior managment's demonstrated commitment to professional-
ism and excellence. It is essential that the senior management of accounting
firms consistently demonstrate this commitment through their attitudes and
actions on a day-to-day basis. No quality control system can be effective
without a commitment by individuals to comply with it.
2.2. Peer-regulation
Peer-regulation is primarily undertaken through the efforts of voluntary
professional associations such as the AICPA and state societies of certified
public accountants. These organizations regulate their members by adopting
codes of professional ethics requiring members to comply with both ethical
and technical standards. Accounting standards are developed by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) [11] and most other standards, including
ethical and auditing standards, are established by the AICPA [12]. In addition,
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the AICPA and some state societies of certified public accountants have
developed voluntary peer review programs and minimum continuing profes-
sional education requirements [13].
At its annual meeting in 1977, the AICPA created the Division for CPA
Firms comprised of the SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies
Practice Section in response to congressional concerns about the profession's
ability to regulate itself [14]. The Public Oversight Board, comprised of five
members, most of whom are not accountants, oversees the activities of the SEC
Practice Section [15]. This independent board represents the interests of users
of financial statements by assisting the accounting profession in improving the
quality of its services. Membership in the SEC Practice Section is voluntary,
and accounting firms that join are required to submit to a peer review every
three years [16].
The peer review process is the foundation of peer-regulation. The objective
of peer reviews is to determine whether accounting firms have adequate quality
control systems and whether the conduct of accounting and auditing engage-
ments is in compliance with these systems. Peer reviews include an examina-
tion of a cross-section of the reviewed firm's accounting and auditing engage-
ments and, in the case of firms with more than one office, a representative
number of offices. Since its establishment, the SEC Practice Section's success
has been significant. First, it has resulted in member firms improving their
quality control systems and their compliance with such systems. Second, it has
resulted in providing public assurances that member firms have established
adequate quality control systems and that they are complying with them.
In 1979, the SEC Practice Section established the Special Investigations
Committee (SIC). Firms who are members of the SEC Practice Section are
required to report all litigation and proceedings against them or firm members
involving alleged failures in the audit of financial statements of SEC registrants
[17]. The SIC assigns one or more of its members to each case. Each case is
subject to screening, monitoring, investigating the firm's quality control sys-
tems and/or investigating the alleged audit failure. The SIC's objective is not
to seek out accounting firms and persons who have engaged in misconduct and
sanction them, but rather to identify deficiencies in a firm's quality control
systems and correct them. Another objective is to identify areas where new
standards might be appropriate. These objectives lead to better quality control
systems and increased assurances that deficiencies do not recur [18].
Unlike the SEC, state licensing authorities, and the courts, the SIC does not
have the power to subpoena documents or to subpoena witnesses, compelling
them to testify under penalty of perjury. Moreover, it lacks any power with
respect to third parties. The experience of the SEC's Division of Enforcement
clearly demonstrates that the ability to get the facts necessary to make
informed judgments is hindered without these powers. Obviously, the inability
to obtain documents and testimony from an independent auditor's client
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makes getting relevant facts difficult and, in some cases, impossible. Less
obvious, but also a major difficulty, is the inability to obtain documents and
testimony from other parties such as creditors, suppliers, and customers.
Although the lack of these powers hinders the ability of the SIC to get all
relevant facts, the restriction diminishes in significance when viewed in the
context of the SIC's objective and the other forms of regulation that exist
which have these powers.
Some have criticized the SIC's charter because it does not provide for
identifying and sanctioning wrongdoers. This criticism is idealistic, but imprac-
tical, given the realities of litigation. Should the SIC identify and sanction
wrongdoers in the midst of existing or even potential litigation, it would be
disastrous to accounting firms and individual independent auditors in terms of
evidence and resulting monetary damages. Thus, adding this responsibility to
the SIC's charter is simply not realistic unless monetary damages are limited.
Limiting the liability of accounting firms and/or accountants would require
legislation.
2.3. State licensing authorities
State licensing authorities, most commonly known as state boards of
accountancy, regulate the practice of public accounting primarily by establish-
ing minimum entrance requirements, promulgating and administering rules
and regulations, and suspending licenses for misconduct [19]. By establishing
minimum requirements for education and experience and by testing prospec-
tive licensees, the state licensing authorities control entry into the profession.
These standards are designed to ensure that independent auditors who enter
the profession meet minimum standards. Many state boards have also added
minimum requirements concerning continuing professional education to their
periodic relicensing standards [20].
Only state licensing authorities have the power to take away an independent
auditor's license to practice as a certified public accountant. An accounting
firm could terminate an individual auditor, but he or she could still practice
individually or with another firm. The SEC could prohibit an auditor from
practicing before it, but he or she could still provide accounting and auditing
services to non-SEC registrants. The AICPA and state societies of certified
public accountants could expel a member, but membership is voluntary and is
not a requirement for practicing. The power of state licensing authorities to
suspend or permanently terminate an independent auditor's license to practice
represents a much more important regulatory tool. However, most state
licensing authorities are faced with limited staffs, limited funds, and, in some
cases, legislative restrictions [21]. These limitations and restrictions minimize
the effectiveness of this form of regulation. At present, most state licensing
authorities only investigate specific cases of substandard performance that
come to their attention.
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A suggestion for improvement in this area was made by the National
Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) in its 1984 "Positive
Enforcement Manual for State Boards of Accountancy" [22]. NASBA suggests
that the state licensing authorities adopt positive enforcement programs in
which they would actively look for cases of substandard performance by
independent auditors, instead of waiting for such matters to come to their
attention. This manual also describes in detail the positive enforcement pro-
grams currently in use in several states. It covers the major program elements,
including suggestions for funding the proposed programs.
2.4. Private litigation
Private litigation is an ever-present threat to independent auditors. Indeed,
the restatement of financial statements or the bankruptcy of a company often
results in a civil action against the independent auditor, irrespective of whether
the auditor's conduct was improper. Moreover, some of these actions are
initiated against accounting firms and individual auditors solely because they
are a potential source of substantial monetary recovery. Private litigation
almost always results in significant defense costs and the consumption of
considerable amounts of time. There is also the possibility of substantial
monetary awards to plantiffs and damage to professional reputations which
could lead to the loss of both existing clients and opportunities to obtain new
clients. Thus, the threat of private litigation and its resulting and potential
damages contribute to ensuring the quality of accounting and auditing engage-
ments conducted by the accounting profession.
2.5. The regulatmy role of the federal government
2.5.1. Federal government oversight
At the forefront of federal government oversight is the SEC. Both the
Securities Act of 1933 [23] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [24]
provide the SEC with express authority to prescribe accounting and reporting
standards [25]. The SEC maintains an active involvement in the accounting,
auditing, and ethical standard-setting processes of the private sector, estab-
lishes some accounting and ethical standards itself, and interprets standards
when deemed necessary. Although it prefers to remain in an overseeing role,
the SEC has, on occasion, overruled accounting standards established by the
private sector. For example, the SEC overruled the AICPA Accounting Princi-
ples Board's opinion concerning the accounting for investment tax credits in
1963 [26] and the FASB's pronouncement on oil and gas accounting in 1977
[27]. The SEC's oversight has historically proved to be both constant and
effective.
The SEC exerts considerable influence over the application of accounting
standards through issuance of Financial Reporting Releases, Staff Accounting
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Bulletins, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. It also exerts
such influence through its interaction with SEC registrants and their indepen-
dent auditors. In meetings between the SEC staff and representatives of
registrants and their independent auditors, specific accounting and reporting
issues are often discussed and resolved.
The SEC meets periodically with the members and staffs of the AICPA's
Auditing Standards Board and the Public Oversight Board to monitor develop-
ments concerning auditors' responsibilities. The SEC also evaluates the ef-
fectiveness of the peer review process within the SEC Practice Section and the
role and effectiveness of oversight by the Public Oversight Board.
Congress has periodically directed its attention to the accounting profession.
The extensive congressional hearings that took place during the 1970s have had
significant positive effects on the accounting profession [28]. First, as previ-
ously discussed, the AICPA established the Division for CPA Firms. Second,
the attention directed to the accounting profession during these congressional
hearings and other congressional concerns resulted in the 1977 enactment of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [29]. This legislation, among other things,
requires SEC registrants to maintain accurate books and records and to devise
and maintain an adequate system of internal controls, and makes it unlawful
to falsify books and records and to lie to auditors [30].
The Act's provisions concerning internal accounting controls have proved to
be beneficial to the accounting profession in three ways. First, as a result of
enactment, many companies undertook extensive reviews of their internal
control systems and implemented improvements. This resulted in improved
controls and more accurate books and records, which in turn has enhanced the
environment in which independent auditors perform their audits. Second, by
making it unlawful to lie to auditors, managements of companies are less likely
to do so. The SEC has aggressively enforced these provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act [31]. Finally, the SEC's vigorous enforcement of the Act
has improved the audit environment.
2.5.2. Federal government enforcement
In investigating financial fraud by entities who are registrants with the SEC,
the SEC's Division of Enforcement routinely reviews the conduct of indepen-
dent auditors. These reviews are directed to whether the auditors' examination
was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, including
whether the financial statements are presented in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles. Federal government enforcement, which takes
the form of the SEC's presence and ability to sanction accounting firms and
individual auditors who practice before it, is a well-recognized and significant
regulatory tool.
In instances where the SEC finds that an independent auditor has engaged
in misconduct, it has two available ways to proceed. First, it may allege a
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violation of, or aiding and abetting a violation of, the federal securities laws in
a civil injunctive action [32]. Second, it may institute a Rule 2(e) administrative
proceeding [331. This rule gives the SEC the authority to discipline and
sanction, including permanently barring from practicing before it, "any per-
son" who is found:
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct.
or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
provision of the Federal securities laws _.., or the rules and regulations thereunder [341.
In some instances, usually involving the most egregious conduct, the SEC will
allege that an independent auditor engaged in misconduct both in a civil
injunctive action and a Rule 2(e) administrative proceeding [35].
Investigations of audit failures by the SEC's Division of Enforcement have
revealed important information concerning the accounting profession. First,
the quality controls of accounting firms that are members of the SEC Practice
Section are usually found to be adequate. Audit failures, therefore, generally
result from "people problems," not quality control deficiencies. The quality
controls of firms that are not members of the SEC Practice Section are more
likely to be found deficient. Second, the Division of Enforcement has found
"people problems" both in accounting firms that are members of the SEC
Practice Section and those that are not. These "people problems" most often
involve independent auditors who: (1) yield to client pressures to bend rules
rather than doing the right thing, thereby placing business and/or career
considerations ahead of professionalism; (2) take the word of their client rather
than obtaining sufficient competent evidential matter; and/or (3) lack the
necessary level of training and/or experience to perform the engagement.
These investigations have also revealed that misconduct by independent
auditors almost never reaches the level of a criminal act. Rather, such miscon-
duct usually constitutes recklessness or something less than recklessness. In-
deed, most independent auditors who are found to have engaged in misconduct
usually are found also to have omitted procedures or to have made mistakes
(i.e., improper professional conduct), but not to have willfully engaged in
misconduct.
An independent auditor who is alleged to have engaged in any type of
misconduct by the SEC is likely to find himself or herself faced with other
penalties involving even greater consequences. These could include loss of
partnership or job, loss of license to practice public accounting, damage to
professional reputation, and the penalties imposed in civil and, perhaps even,
criminal court proceedings.
SEC enforcement actions involving financial reporting and disclosure matters
that are directed to companies, their officers, directors, and employees, or their
independent auditors, often influence the accounting profession. Enforcement
actions have caused certain generally accepted auditing standards, generally
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accepted accounting principles, and quality control systems of accounting
firms to be established or modified. Moreover, enforcement actions have
resulted in a greater awareness on the part of individuals, whether they be
officers, directors, or employees of companies, or independent auditors, of
what constitutes illegal and improper conduct. This awareness, coupled with
the knowledge of the SEC's enforcement presence, serves as a deterrent.
2.6. Role of the press
The financial press consistently prints articles involving companies, their
officers, directors, and employees, and independent auditors who are found or
alleged to have engaged in misconduct. SEC enforcement actions are almost
always publicized by many magazines and newspapers. Press coverage of
actual or alleged misconduct by independent auditors serves two functions.
First, it serves as a deterrent to others. Second, it serves to cause the standards
of the accounting profession and the effectiveness of regulation to be scrutinized
and improved.
3. Critical analysis
3.1. Regulatory conflicts
Although, as stated earlier, each of the various forms of regulation work
collectively to regulate the accounting profession, there also exists intra- and
inter-regulatory conflict. The primary conflict is between forms of regulation
designed to serve punitive objectives and those designed to serve corrective and
preventive objectives. Punitive forms of regulation are designed to punish
accounting firms and individual auditors who engage in unprofessional or
illegal conduct [36]. Corrective and preventive forms of regulation are designed
to enhance the quality of services provided by independent auditors and,
ultimately, to ensure that users of financial statements are provided with the
most accurate information in the most timely fashion [37]. Ideally, as errors in
financial statements are discovered, independent auditors would freely ac-
knowledge the errors and any deficiencies in the conduct of their audit.
Corrected financial statements would be promptly issued. However, the pres-
ence of punitive forms of regulation (including private litigation, SEC
enforcement actions, and, in extreme cases, criminal actions) [38] sometimes
prevents this ideal situation from occurring. Indeed, on occasion, independent
auditors have refused to acknowledge errors in previously issued financial
statements they audited and even permitted errors to be repeated year after
year because of the fear of punitive forms of regulation.
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Regrettably, there is a need to maintain punitive forms of regulation
because of their deterrent effects. The challenge is to strike the proper balance
between punitive forms and corrective and preventive forms of regulation.
3.2. The effectiveness of regulation
The many forms of regulation work collectively to regulate the accounting
profession and protect the public from unprofessional and illegal conduct.
However, one might ask why audit failures nevertheless occur. In order to
address this question, the question of audit failures must be placed in perspec-
tive. When one considers the many thousands of audits performed by the
accounting profession annually, it becomes clear that the frequency of audit
failures is actually very low [39]. Moreover, regulation is not and never can be
sufficient to eliminate all audit failures. Regulation itself can never eliminate
all omissions and mistakes by individuals.
The accounting profession has made substantial improvements during the
past decade. The most impressive and effective improvement has been in the
area of quality control systems and compliance with such systems. The
establishment of the SEC Practice Section and the peer review process led to
many of these improvements. However, despite this, there remains a need for
additional improvements.
3.3. Improvements to consider
In considering what improvements would be beneficial, it is important to
focus both on previously implemented improvements that have been effective
and the primary reasons for today's audit failures. Also, contemplated
improvements must be evaluated in light of practicability.
As noted above, the quality controls of accounting firms which are members
of the SEC Practice Section have been improved and generally are adequate.
Moreover, the peer review process has resulted in providing public assurances
that member firms have established adequate systems and that they are
complying with them. However, all accounting firms are not members of the
SEC Practice Section. Therefore, public assurances do not exist for such
non-member firms. Indeed, membership in the SEC Practice Section is volun-
tary, and some accounting firms that audit SEC registrants are not members
and, therefore, are not subjected to its peer review process. Substantial
improvements would result by expanding the peer review process to include all
accounting firms, whether they audit companies which are registrants with the
SEC or not.
In the area of enforcement, the state licensing authorities could and should
increase their role and effectiveness. Adoption of positive enforcement pro-
grams recently suggested by NASBA [40] could provide an additional effective
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nationwide enforcement presence and serve to influence state of mind perhaps
more than any other enforcement effort. The benefits could be substantial,
both for the accounting profession and the public.
However, NASBA's suggestion faces many implementation problems and
difficulties. For example, one of the ways suggested by NASBA for state
licensing authorities to identify cases of substandard performance is through a
peer review process [41]. The use of a peer review process, which is designed to
serve corrective and preventive objectives, would cause conflict if also used to
achieve punitive objectives. Because of the demonstrated success of the peer
review process in improving and encouraging compliance with the quality
controls of accounting firms, the additional use of peer reviews as an
enforcement tool would hinder the more important corrective and preventive
aspects. Indeed, the SEC's Division of Enforcement has recognized this con-
flict and has chosen not to jeopardize the success of the peer review process by
using it as an enforcement tool. Therefore, this method of implementation
should be rejected. Each possible implementation method for adopting
NASBA's suggested program should be carefully evaluated in a similar fashion
to ensure that its adoption does not create these kinds of pitfalls.
Ensuring the competence of new certified public accountants to perform
audits also would reduce the incidence of audit failure. Accountants who
graduate from colleges and universities are just that: accountants, not auditors.
While colleges and universities usually include one or more audit courses in
their curriculums, classrooms do not adequately prepare an accountant to
perform audits. The accounting profession teaches auditing primarily through
on-the-job training. Indeed, an accountant's ability to audit effectively is
directly dependent on the quality and quantity of his or her on-the-job
training. However, the licensing requirements for certified public accountants
in many states do not adequately address the quality and quantity of audit
experience. Thus, persons who only have accounting experience and no audit
experience may be licensed as certified public accountants and be permitted to
perform audits [42]. Investigations conducted by the SEC's Division of
Enforcement often highlight this deficiency. The AICPA and state licensing
authorities should examine this deficiency in the education and licensing of
accountants and establish methods to ensure that certified public acountants
who undertake to perform audits are sufficiently prepared for the task.
Ensuring proper education of auditors would serve to protect the interests of
both independent auditors and the public.
Finally, the accounting profession has a public image problem. Few persons
outside the accounting profession have an understanding of the accounting
profession, particularly what it does, how it does it, and what its responsibili-
ties are [43]. In fact, as stated earlier, whenever financial statements are
restated or there is a business failure, many persons immediately leap to the
conclusion that the independent auditors somehow acted improperly and bear
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some responsibility. Because of these problems, the profession should expand
its efforts to inform the public about the profession.
4. Conclusion
The critical role of the accounting profession in the financial reporting
process and the public's reliance on the profession places it in a unique
position. It is essential that the profession's performance be constantly moni-
tored and that possible improvements be identified, evaluated, and, if found to
be beneficial, implemented. Present forms of monitoring include: self-regu-
lation, peer regulation, state licensing authorities, federal government oversight
and enforcement, private litigation, and the media. Although the accounting
profession has accomplished much to improve its performance, there is much
yet to do. To wait for possible increased federal government regulation before
implementing improvements, as happened in 1977, is both dangerous and
foolish. Even though a "federal auditor corps," as proposed in the dialogue
between Senator Reynolds and Colonel Carter in 1933, is not a real possibility
today, the possibility of increased federal government regulation certainly is.
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